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Introduction
Housing policy programs are typically intended to make housing more affordable for low-income households and to influence their housing and non-housing consumption.
These programs can be divided into two broad categories: (1) tenant-based programs, such as housing vouchers and housing allowances or benefits; and (2) project-or placebased programs, such as public rental housing or privately-owned subsidized rental housing.
Place-based programs are often considered problematic because the subsidy in the form of rent savings is tied to the buildings and is thereby by design targeted to specific geographic locations. This may lead to high concentration of poor households in particular neighborhoods and buildings, which has been shown to have negative effects in certain contexts. On the other hand, it may be possible to mitigate this concentration by locating the buildings to sought-after neighborhoods and by applying tenant selection rules that allow middle-and even high-income households to occupy the units. In this paper, we contribute to the discussion on the relative merits of place-and tenant-based programs by analyzing a large public housing program in Finland and by comparing it to the housing allowance program. We focus on the capital city Helsinki where the city owns a large number of public housing units. The rents of these units are cost-based and regulated so as to make them more affordable than units in the private uncontrolled rental market. The program also explicitly aims at preventing the spatial concentration of poor households by scattering the buildings across neighborhoods and by allowing also relatively well-off households to occupy a public housing unit.
In the first part of the paper, we ask what type of households benefit and by how much from the rent savings generated by the public housing program. We define the rent savings as the difference between the rent a public housing unit would command in the private rental market and its actual regulated rent. The rent savings estimates are not trivial to come by because public housing units differ from private rental units with respect to location and physical attributes. To overcome this problem, we use detailed micro data on the attributes, rents and the location of private and public rental housing units in Helsinki. Using hedonic regression methods with spatial fixed effects, we recover implicit prices for housing attributes within the private rental market where the rents are unregulated. We then use these implicit prices along with the estimates for spatial fixed effects to predict market rents and to calculate rent savings for individual public housing units. Finally, we match these unit level rent savings to household level register data, which allows us to compare the distributional effects of the rent savings created by the public housing and the means-tested housing allowance programs.
In the second part of the paper, we ask whether the public housing program is successful in preventing segregation and how the program compares to the tenant-based alternative in this respect. We answer these questions by comparing the socio-economic mix and quality of the neighborhoods of public housing tenants and similar households living in private rental housing. This comparison allows us to assess the ability of the public housing program to affect the socio-economic mix of neighborhoods and especially the exposure of low-income households to different neighborhood characteristics.
Our findings can be summarized as follows. We estimate that the rent savings to public housing tenants are considerable and comparable in size to the housing allowance. The size of this public housing subsidy depends on the physical attributes of the unit, and it decreases with distance to the central business district (CBD) and is highest in expensive neighborhoods.
We also find that the housing allowance is much more concentrated to lowincome households than the public housing subsidy. The households in the lowest income quintile receive 66% of the total amount of housing allowances, but only 34% of the total rent savings created by public housing. Moreover, 22% of the public housing subsidy goes to the top half of the income distribution.
As discussed above, allocating part of the public housing subsidy toward middleand high-income households may prevent spatial concentration of poor households. Our analysis of the neighborhoods that public housing tenants occupy suggests that this strategy does not work as intended. We find that low-income public housing tenants are exposed to poorer, less educated and lower quality neighborhoods (measured either at the zip code or at the building level) than similar low-income households living in private rental units. This finding suggests that public housing programs may lead to more segregation than tenant-based alternatives even when neighborhood mixing is an explicit aim of the program.
It is important to note that when comparing the programs we ignore their general equilibrium effects in the housing market. Because the public housing sector constitutes a large share of all rental housing in Helsinki, a large reform would result in a new sorting equilibrium with new equilibrium housing prices (see e.g. Early, 2000 and Bayer and McMillan, 2012 and Geyer, 2017 . Therefore, our results are not directly useful when evaluating major reforms to current programs. We are also unable to relate the direct benefits to the administrative costs of the programs. 
Related literature
Our study contributes to the large literature evaluating housing policy programs.
In this section, we review this literature focusing on research most related to our paper.
The current literature is somewhat tilted toward U.S. policy programs, and a comprehensive summary of the U.S. experience can be found in Collinson et al. (2016) and Olsen and Zabel (2015) .
Our study is closely related to papers that estimate the rent savings in public or privately-owned subsidized housing. Le Blanc and Laferrère (2001) show that in France the rent savings for public housing tenants are substantial and tend to increase with city size and decrease with unit size. They also conclude that the gains are less concentrated on the poorest part of the population than those of tenant-based housing subsidies.
Similarly, Kattenberg and Hassink (2017) show that in the Netherlands the rent savings for social housing tenants are on average equal to almost 40% of the market rent and are higher in municipalities with high house values and little social housing. Burge (2011) in turn analyzes the low-income housing tax credit (LIHTC) program in the U.S. and finds that rent savings are sizable, but at the same time constitute a relatively small fraction of the programs costs.
Our paper is also related to the literature studying the quality and socio-economic mix of the neighborhoods that low-income households occupy. For the U.S., the general finding is that on average public housing tenants live in worse quality and poorer neighborhoods than housing voucher holders (Olsen and Zabel, 2015) . For example, Horn et al. (2014) find that the housing voucher holders live near better schools than public housing tenants, whereas Lens et al. (2011) find that voucher holders live in safer neighborhoods (in terms of crime) than public housing and LIHTC tenants. Susin (2005) and Lens et al. (2011) report similar results with respect to neighborhood poverty rate. 3 Collinson and Ganong (2017) study the effects of the voucher program using a reform in Dallas. They find that a policy that indexes rent ceilings to neighborhood rents, instead of metro-level rents, leads voucher holders to move in higher-quality neighborhoods with lower crime, poverty and unemployment. Carlson et al. (2012) review the earlier evidence on the effects of tenant-based programs on households' relocation decisions. Galiani et al. (2015) and Geyer (2017) use structural sorting models to simulate how the parameters of housing voucher programs affect households' neighborhood and housing consumption choices. Using U.S. data, both papers find that the details of the voucher program affect voucher recipients' choice regarding the trade-off between housing consumption and neighborhood quality. To our knowledge, similar evidence comparing the performance of different programs and program parameters in a European context is lacking.
One important reason for trying to understand the effect of housing programs on neighborhood quality and socio-economic mix is related to neighborhood effects.
Although the mechanisms behind these effects are not well understood, there exists some credible evidence on the causal effects of neighborhoods especially on children's long-term outcomes (Chetty et al., 2016 and Chyn, 2016) . However, the effects may be context specific as, for example, recent studies from England do not find effects running from deprived neighborhoods to student performance (Gibbons et al., 2013 and Weinhardt, 2014) . 3 These findings may be partially explained by the incentives within the LIHTC program that lead to more LIHTC development in locations with low market rent (Lang, 2012) . On the other hand, Ellen et al. (2016) analyze both siting and tenant selection in the LIHTC program and find little evidence that the LIHTC is increasing the concentration of poverty.
The programs may also have indirect or unintended effects on top of the direct effects discussed above. Renting housing units below market rents may lead to misallocation of the units as tenants lose the subsidy if they move to a private sector unit. The welfare effects from misallocation have been estimated in the context of rent control in the U.S. (Early, 2000 and Glaeser and Luttmer, 2003) and in public housing in the Netherlands (Van Ommeren and Van der Vlist, 2016) and they appear to be substantial. Kattenberg and Hassink (2017) report that in the Netherlands the lock-in effects are strong especially for tenants with relatively high incomes. This issue is important when assessing which type of households benefit from public housing. If households are able to prolong their stay in public housing when their income increases, fewer lowincome households have the opportunity to enter the public housing sector.
Rent regulation may also affect labor market outcomes. For example, Svarer et al. (2005) find that in Denmark the probability of finding a local job increases with the rent control intensity, whereas the probability of finding a job outside the local labor market decreases with the rent control intensity of the housing unit. Lui and Suen (2011) show that public housing tenants in Hong Kong tend to live farther away from their workplace than private market tenants.
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Finally, a number U.S. papers study the crowding-out effects of supply side housing subsidies (Malpezzi and Vandell, 2002 , Sinai and Waldfogel, 2005 , BaumSnow and Marion, 2009 and Eriksen and Rosenthal, 2010 . The evidence from these papers suggests that construction of public housing or supply subsidies more generally leads to substantial crowding-out in locations with inelastic housing supply. This means that the policy is unlikely to increase the overall housing stock in these locations.
According to a recent Finnish study by Oikarinen et al. (2015) , the housing supply in the Helsinki housing market is particularly inelastic, and thus, public housing may lead to substantial crowding-out of private construction.
These results have important general equilibrium implications. If housing supply is inelastic, both demand and supply side programs may lead to higher overall rental rate in the private rental market. The mechanisms behind the rent effects in the case of public housing are described in Fallis and Smith (1984) , Early (2000) and Leung et al. (2012) . However, empirical evidence concerning the magnitude of these effects is largely lacking due to the difficulty of estimating general equilibrium effects.
6 Similar mechanisms may operate also in the case of tenant-based programs (for further discussion see e.g. Eerola and Lyytikäinen, 2017) . Gibbons and Manning (2006) study the UK housing benefit program and do not find evidence of strong general equilibrium effects. Exploiting geographic variation in the size of the U.S. housing voucher system, Eriksen and Ross (2015) conclude that increased supply of vouchers did not affect the overall rental rate. housing units in Helsinki almost half of which are rental units. Roughly 20% of the total 6 Some papers have analyzed the effects of rent control on the rents of uncontrolled units in the same housing market. E.g. Early (2000) finds that rent control increases the rents of uncontrolled units. In addition, some papers have studied more localized spillover effects of public housing and rent control on nearby uncontrolled units (see e.g. Sims, 2007 , Baum-Snow and Marion, 2009 , Autor et al., 2014 and Diamond and McQuade, 2016 . 7 Technically, the public housing buildings are also owned by limited liability companies, which are owned by the municipalities.
Institutional setting
housing stock is subsidized through the various schemes implemented by ARA. 8 Close to 70% of these subsidized units are public housing units owned by the city of Helsinki.
The public housing units are subject to different forms of regulation. The rents are cost-based and depend on the capital and maintenance costs of the building. In Helsinki, the buildings are situated at lots owned by the city, which the city rents at a discount.
The lot rent discount directly lowers the capital cost of the building, which is then passed on to the tenants in the form of lower rents. Furthermore, the rules imply that the rent paid by the tenant does not depend on the characteristics of the tenant.
Tenant selection is based on legislation. The selection criteria include the applicant's urgency of housing need, its wealth and income. However, there is no explicit ranking of the applicants or a formal queuing system. The applicants cannot apply for a specific flat, but instead they have to specify one or several neighborhoods from which want to rent a flat. In addition, once a household has obtained a public housing unit, it has the right to occupy the unit indefinitely, even if its income increases. 9 The city aims at maintaining a diverse tenant structure in the buildings and in the larger neighborhood.
Details of the housing allowance program. The housing allowance program is
financed by the government through the Social Insurance Institution of Finland (KELA). At the time of our study, the program consisted of a general housing allowance and separate schemes for pensioners and students. Subsequently, the student households have been moved into the general housing allowance scheme. In total, the housing allowance expenditures amounted to some 0.75% of the GDP in 2014.
The housing allowance is a means-tested benefit covering up to 80% of the rent up to a ceiling. The rent ceiling depends on local housing market conditions and is higher in more expensive regions. In addition, the allowance features a deductible if 8 Scanlon et al. (2015) conclude in a study of 12 European countries that the share of public and privatelyowned subsidized housing (jointly referred to as social housing) of the total housing stock varies from 2% in Spain to over 30% in the Netherlands. As the figures from Helsinki are close to the national averages, the subsidized rental housing sector in Finland is quite large in European comparison. As in many other European countries, this share has been slightly decreasing during the last ten years. 9 The tenant selection rules with respect to household income have varied over the years. For example, in 2008 the explicit income limits were abolished in the initial selection phase, but reintroduced in the beginning of 2017 in the Helsinki Metropolitan Region. The income limits only apply at the initial selection phase meaning that a household is not obliged to relocate if its income increases above the initial limit. Our data come from 2011, when there were no explicit income limits in place.
household income exceeds an income limit which depends on the household size.
Eligibility does not depend on tenure, but 95% of the housing allowance recipients live in rental housing. Also public housing tenants are eligible for the housing allowance.
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The system is similar to the housing benefit systems in other European countries, but differs from the U.S. housing voucher system in some important aspects. First, the Finnish housing allowances are an entitlement, while in the U.S. not all eligible households receive a voucher. Second, the Finnish program does not impose any requirements on the quality or the rents of the apartments of the recipient households.
Typically, the landlord is unaware whether the tenant is housing allowance recipient or not. 
Data sources
We combine data from three sources: housing units can be classified according to tenure into owner-occupied, public rental housing, privately-owned subsidized rental housing, and private rental housing. An important limitation is that the data do not contain information on the rents paid by the households.
Building level data on public housing rents. The second data set comes from the city of Helsinki and includes building level information on the average monthly rents per square meter of the public housing units owned by the city (roughly 700 buildings in Helsinki). This rent information can be matched to the household level data using the address of the building. In some buildings, the rent per square meter is the same in all units. In others, it varies somewhat according to the size and the story of the unit. These within building differences are quite small meaning that rent per square meter together with information on the unit's floor area give us a quite precise measure of monthly rents of individual public housing units.
These rent data are not available for privately-owned subsidized rental housing.
Therefore, we cannot to estimate the rent savings for the tenants in the privately-owned subsidized rental housing. This is the main reason for mostly focusing on public housing instead of the entire place-based program.
Housing unit level data on private rental market rents and unit attributes.
Finally, in order to estimate rent savings for the public housing tenants, we need to predict the market rents for the public housing units in our data. We use data on private rental units collected from a commercial website (Vuokraovi.com), where landlords publish information about the units available for rent. All major institutional landlords use it as an advertising channel. We accessed the website on a weekly basis starting in
May 2012 until the end of December 2013.
The website covers the whole of Finland, but we use information on units in
Helsinki. The final estimation sample includes only the units owned by institutional landlords who typically own an entire building instead of individual units. In these cases the posted rent is equal to the actual rent paid. We exclude units owned by private persons advertising in the website because they are more likely to engage in bargaining with the potential tenant. We also exclude furnished units and units owned by non-profit organizations.
Each observation contains the rent of the unit, the street address and detailed information about the physical attributes of the unit. Thus, these data can be used to predict what the market rent of a particular public housing unit in a particular building would be based on the unit attributes that are available both in the household level data and the private rental market unit data.
Estimating the rent savings from public housing

Descriptive statistics
The first step in our analysis is to estimate the market rents of the public housing units.
Because housing is a differentiated product, we need to have information on how different attributes of the units are priced in the private market. Notes: The data on private rental units come from Vuokraovi.com. The public housing rent data come from the city of Helsinki and the public housing unit characteristics data come from Statistics Finland.
The map in Figure 1 further illustrates the spatial distribution of the public housing units in our data. The map includes data only from those zip codes where we have data on both private and public housing units. The CBD is situated in the southwestern peninsula. 
,
where ij p is the monthly rent of a private market unit i in zip code area j, x are the unit's physical attributes including distance to CBD, μ j represent zip code area fixed effects that capture unobservable location specific attributes, and u is the error term. 13 Helsinki is divided into some 80 zip code areas with an average size of roughly 7,000
inhabitants. In our data, there are public housing units in 45 zip code areas. In the estimation, we use private rental market data only from these areas (see Figure 1) .
We define the unit specific rent saving or the public housing subsidy for public housing unit k as
where ˆk p is the out-of-sample prediction from Eq. (1) for unit k and sub k p is the unit's actual rent.
Of course, the accuracy of our subsidy estimate relies on the reliability of our market rent prediction. In estimating the hedonic model, we need to worry about two distinct set of attributes, the physical attributes of the housing unit and the characteristics of the neighborhood. In principle, we could add variables describing the neighborhood characteristics in the regression equation in the same manner as the physical characteristics of the unit and hope that the remaining unobserved neighborhood characteristics are a minor problem. However, a more reliable approach is to use spatial fixed effects (μ j ), which enable modelling the effect of different location attributes without having to include them separately into the model. This is useful in our setting, because we are not interested in estimating the effect of various neighborhood characteristics on rents.
In addition to unobservable neighborhood attributes, we need to worry about unobservable unit attributes, most importantly the condition and quality of the unit.
There may be differences in the condition and quality of the units in the two sectors as 13 We use a linear form for the hedonic regression because it is easier to interpret and relies on less restrictive statistical assumptions for prediction purposes compared to a log-linear form. See e.g. Manning and Mullahy (2001) and Wooldridge (2006) . landlords in the private rental market are likely to have stronger incentives to maintain and improve the condition of their units than public housing landlords. This is a potential problem because the difference in the predicted market rent and the actual rent for the public housing units can arise from these omitted variables.
Unfortunately, there is little we can do to address this problem with the data at hand, but we should note that our predictions will most probably produce an upper bound for the market rents of the public housing units. At the same time, we believe that the relative rent savings within the public housing sector are more reliable. For example, if quality and condition differences are not related to the location of the unit, any spatial differences in the rent savings reflect true heterogeneity in the subsidy that public housing tenants receive.
In order to assess the accuracy of our prediction, we draw a 10% random sample from the private rental market data which we do not use in the estimation. We then predict the market rent and calculate a prediction error for each private rental unit in the sample. On average, this out-of-sample prediction error should be zero and it should not vary systematically with observable unit attributes. The degree of variation in the outof-sample prediction is also useful in interpreting the subsidy estimates. Figure 2 shows the distribution of the public housing subsidy based on Eq. (2) and the distribution of the out-of-sample prediction error for the private rental housing units not used in the estimation. The average monthly subsidy in public housing is about 370
Determinants of the public housing subsidy
Euros per unit or 6.7 Euros per square meter. The distribution of the estimated subsidy for the public housing units is clearly different from the prediction error for the out-ofsample private market units. The average subsidy is zero for the private rental housing.
However, Figure 2 also clearly shows that there is substantial variation in the out-ofsample prediction error for the private market units. This is to be expected as we do not observe all the characteristics of the units that influence the rents. There are also a couple large outliers among the private rental units for which we substantially underestimate the rent level as can be seen from Panel A. This variation should be kept in mind when interpreting the results. In some cases, the rent per square meter is the same in all units of the building. In other cases, it also depends on the floor area and the story of the unit. This pricing rule explains the very high R 2 for public housing units. 
Distributional effects
In this section, we link our estimates of the unit specific subsidies to the characteristics of the tenants and study the distributional effects of the subsidy. Table 3 first shows some descriptive statistics of owner-occupiers, private rental housing tenants and public housing tenants in our data.
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The public housing tenants have on average lower incomes than those in private rental housing. The renters in the two segments are also different in other respects:
Households in public housing tend to be less educated, larger and have more often small children. Out of all public housing tenants, some 23% also receive housing allowances, while the share of housing allowance recipients is 13% among the private rental housing tenants and only 2% among the owner-occupiers. The average allowance is higher in public housing than in private rental housing. This difference can be explained by public housing tenants having on average lower incomes, having more often small children and living in larger units. In order to study the distributional effects, we divide the households into income deciles based on their disposable income. 16 Panel A of Figure 5 presents the shares of different tenure (owner-occupied, private rental housing, public housing and privatelyowned subsidized housing) in the income deciles. Two interesting observations stand out. First, in the lowest deciles, private rental housing is more common than public housing and privately-owned subsidized housing combined. For example, in the lowest decile, more than 40% of the households live in private rental housing while only roughly 20% live in public housing or privately-owned subsidized housing. Second, both public housing and privately-owned subsidized housing extend well beyond the lowest deciles.
Panel B of Figure 5 shows the distribution of the public housing subsidy in each income decile. For comparison, the figure also reports the housing allowance in each decile. 17 For each decile, the figure shows the shares of the total public housing subsidy and the total housing allowance. Recall that eligibility for housing allowance depends on household income and composition, but not on tenure. That is, renters in different sectors (public housing, privately-owned subsidized housing and private rental housing)
as well as owner-occupiers can all be housing allowance recipients.
The distributions of these two benefits are quite different. The households in the two lowest deciles receive some 66% of the total amount of the housing allowance, but only 34% of the rent savings created by public housing. Therefore, the public housing subsidy is clearly less targeted towards the low-income households than the housing allowance. Moreover, 22% of the public housing subsidy goes to the top half of the income distribution. 16 We scale the household income using the OECD equivalence scale which assigns value 1 to the first adult household member, 0.7 to each additional adult and 0.5 to each child. In Table 4 ibution. Notes: The income quintiles are based on disposable income scaled by the OECD equivalence scale. All the numbers represent quantile means in the household groups. The annual means of disposable household income, the housing allowance and the public housing subsidy are scaled by the OECD equivalence scale. The mean housing allowance and the mean public housing subsidy are calculated over households that received these subsidies. Disposable income includes the housing allowance, but does not include the public housing subsidy. The average housing allowance is not reported in the two top quintiles due to the small number of recipient households in the sample.
Comparing neighborhood exposure
By reducing the price of housing relative to other consumption, both tenant-based and place-based policies can affect the location choices of low-income households. Due to the lower price of housing, households can either increase other consumption or move to a larger unit or to a better neighborhood. Therefore, both tenant-based and placebased programs may influence the neighborhood quality that low-income households are exposed to. The evidence from the U.S. programs seems to suggest that place-based programs fare worse than tenant-based alternatives in this respect. However, it is not clear that the same true in settings where the neighborhood mix is an explicit aim of the place-based program.
One reason for this is that place-based programs can be used to influence not only the location choices of low-income households but also who lives next to them.
Targeting part of the public housing subsidy towards middle-income and high-income households can, therefore, be motivated by the aim of creating mixed-income neighborhoods and buildings. Furthermore, Leung at al. (2012) argue using a general equilibrium sorting model that the location of public housing units is a fundamental policy variable when it comes to influencing low-income households' access to local public goods.
Within the Finnish program, the creation of mixed-income neighborhoods and buildings can happen through building location, tenant selection to a particular building and through the unlimited right to occupy the public housing unit. In this section, we compare the neighborhoods occupied by low-income public housing tenants and similar low-income households living in private rental units.
We use zip code areas and buildings to define a neighborhood and consider four neighborhood socio-economic mix and quality measures: the median annual disposable income, the share of households under the local poverty line (defined as having less than 60% of the median income in Helsinki), the share of households with a master's degree and the rental rate (Euros per square meter) in private rental housing. The first three measures are directly related to the characteristics of the neighbors that the lowincome households are exposed to. The last measure aims at capturing neighborhood amenities that are reflected in market rents. The income, poverty rate and education measures are estimated from our household data. The average rental rate by zip code in the private rental market comes from Statistics Finland.
Our strategy is to compare the exposure of public housing tenants and private rental housing tenants to different neighborhood characteristics by income quintile using the following regression model:
where Y is a measure of neighborhood (or building) quality, P is a dummy variable indicating public housing tenancy, I is an indicator function taking value one if household i belongs to income quintile j and zero otherwise, z is a vector of household characteristics and ε is the error term. Since we want to compare public housing tenants and private rental housing tenants that are similar in terms of life-cycle and family size, we control for the age of household head, whether the household has small children, whether the household is single and the number of person in the household. We also exclude all student households from these analyses. It should be stressed that our aim is not to estimate the causal effect of public housing tenancy on households' neighborhood quality, but instead to describe and compare the neighborhoods that households are exposed to. The more interesting result for our purposes concerns the sorting of public housing tenants compared to private rental housing tenants. Two results stand out from 19 We include only those zip codes that have at least 20 households in our data. The number of households in our sample in these zip codes ranges from 29 to 1736. 20 It is possible that private rental housing tenants and public housing tenants in the first income quintile are different even if we control for household characteristics. An alternative way to control for underlying Second, the pattern across income quintiles in the public housing sector is quite similar to that in the private market. Public housing tenants higher up in the income distribution live in better quality neighborhoods than the ones in the lowest income quintile. In fact, the public housing tenants in the second and third income quintile live in similar zip code areas as the private rental tenants in the same income quintile.
However, the comparison between the public housing tenants and private rental housing tenants in the fifth income quintile indicates that the public housing tenants live in zip code areas with lower median income (by 1,451 Euros) and lower share of households with a master's degree (by 3.6 percentage points). This may be partially explained by the fact that in the fifth income quintile the private rental tenants have on average higher incomes than the public housing tenants (see Table 4 ).
differences is to focus on those low-income households that are housing allowance recipients during each month of the year. When doing so, we obtain the same results: housing allowance recipients in public housing live in neighborhoods with lower median income, lower share of people with a master's degree and lower market rents than similar housing allowance recipients in private rental market. This rather strong sorting by income also within the public housing sector is somewhat surprising. There are at least three potential explanations for this finding.
First, the rental rate in public housing units tends to be higher close to the CBD.
Although the between neighborhoods rent differences in public housing are much less pronounced than in the private rental market, it could be that higher rents induce lowincome households to seek public housing units from less expensive neighborhoods.
Second, since the rent savings tend to be larger in more sought-after neighborhoods with higher market rents, the lock-in effects may also be larger in these neighborhoods.
This means that public housing tenants in attractive neighborhoods may be less likely to move when their income increases because by moving they have to give up substantial rent savings. In less sought-after neighborhoods where rent savings in public housing are smaller, public housing tenants may be more willing to move from public housing when their income increases. Finally and in connection to the second point, the public housing units in sought-after neighborhoods may become vacant less frequently (see also Kattenberg and Hassink, 2017) . Low-income households may not be able to afford to wait for such a unit, and therefore, are not selected into attractive locations.
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Next we turn to building level outcomes. In Table 6 we report the results of the neighborhood exposure estimation at the building level. 22 The results are quite similar to those in Table 5 . Low-income public housing tenants (the first income quintile) live in buildings with a lower median income, a higher share of households below the city level poverty threshold, and a lower education level than similar low-income households in private rental housing. In fact, the differences to exposure between these two household groups are larger at the building level than at the zip code level. 23 This suggests again that allocating some of the public housing units to middle-income and high-income households does not guarantee that the low-income public housing tenants live in buildings with a more diverse residential structure than similar low-income households in the private rental housing.
There are various potential explanations for why the low-income private rental tenants live in buildings with more diverse residential structure. The results may be related to tenant selection and differences in the strength of the lock-in effects in the same manner as at the zip code level. In addition, private rental housing tenants often live in the same buildings with owner-occupiers. Because owner-occupied households have on average higher incomes these mixed-tenure buildings tend to be more mixedincome than those that are reserved for public housing tenants only. 21 We do not observe the length of stay in current unit in the data. We also do not have information about the tenant selection. Therefore, we cannot assess the importance of these different explanations. 22 We do not consider the average rental rate because it does not have the similar interpretation at the building level as at the zip code level. 23 We also estimated these models using only those households who received the housing allowance in each month of the year. The results are similar. The results reported in Tables 5 and 6 are qualitatively similar to the results found in the U.S. These similarities suggest that it is difficult to design place-based housing programs so that poor tenants would not end up in poorer quality neighborhoods compared to households that receive tenant-based subsidies and have the freedom to choose their neighborhood. This is true even in Helsinki where social mixing has been a stated goal of the program throughout its history.
Conclusions
This paper analyzes the relative merits of large place-based and tenant-based programs in Finland by comparing their effects on housing affordability and on neighborhood quality. We estimate that the total rent savings to households living in public housing units in Helsinki is considerable and comparable in size to the housing allowance, the main tenant-based housing program. This public housing subsidy depends on the physical attributes of the unit and especially its location. It decreases substantially as the distance to the CBD increases. When comparing the distribution of the public housing subsidy to that of the means-tested housing allowance, we find that the public housing subsidy is clearly less targeted towards low-income households.
In the second part of the paper, ask whether directing a share of the public housing subsidy toward middle-and high-income households work as intended in preventing the spatial concentration of poor households. Our results indicate that the low-income public housing tenants live in poorer, less educated and lower quality neighborhoods (measured either at the zip code or at the building level) than similar private rental housing tenants in the same income quintile. This finding suggests that public housing programs may lead to more segregation than tenant-based alternatives even when neighborhood mixing is an explicit aim of the program.
Several important questions remain unanswered. Perhaps the most important ones are related to the effects of major reforms. Because the public housing sector constitutes a large share of all rental housing in Helsinki, it may influence the rental rate in the private rental market. A large reform would result in a new sorting equilibrium with new equilibrium housing prices. Therefore, such policy changes cannot be evaluated without taking into account general equilibrium effects. Tackling this issues using structural sorting models in the same way as Galiani et al. (2015) and Geyer (2017) in the case of the U.S. housing voucher program seems like a fruitful avenue for future research.
